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IGH EMPLOYMENT and price stability are two
of this country’s foremost economic goals-. In contrast
to the early part of the 1960’s when prices were
relatively stable but unemployment svas high, and
the latter part of that decade when unemployment
was low but inflation was rapid, the early l97O’s have
been marked both by high unemployment rates and
by rapid inflation. Since the adoption by the Con-
gress in 1946 of goals calling for the achievement of
maximum purchasing power and full employment, the
simultaneous realization of price stability and full
employment has been rare.
These goals were reaffirmed by the Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) in a recent Report.tm The Committee
recommended that “The President and Congress
should adopt as a long-term objective the tivin goals
of an unemployment rate no higher than 3 per cent
and an annual increase in the GNP deflator of no
more than 2 per cent.”2
In only tivo years since 1946 have the Committee’s
employment and price stability goals been achieved
simultaneously. In 1952 and 1953 an unemployment
rate of 3 per cent or less and a rise in prices of less
than 2 per cent svere attained. Moderate monetary
growth at a 3.7 per cent annual rate in the 1951-53
period facilitated the attainment of the inflation goal.
Employment as a proportion of the labor force in
1952 and 1953 was enhanced by the fact that many
i”Repomt of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the
United States, on the February 1971 Economic Report of
the President,” (Washington, D. C., 1971 Joint Economic
Report, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 34.
2Thid. Representative Richard Boiling (Missouri) rejects the
increase in prices of 2 per cent as being inconsistent with
the 1946 Employment Act’s objective of stable prices.
potential young workers svere in the armed forces
Kproportionally more than during the Vietnam War).
Moreover, there svere fewer of these young individ-
uals (ivhose unemnploymuemmt rate is typically higher
than the average) than usual because of the low
birth rates of the 1930’s-
Many of the conditions surrounding the 1952-53
attainment of the employment and price goals do
not exist presently and are not likely to exist in the
hear future. For example, young inexperienced
workers are expected to enter the labor force at more
rapid rates than during the early l950’s for some time
to comne. Moreover, the money stock has expanded at
a much more rapid rate in recent years than in the
early 1950’s. Thus, the Committee’s endorsement of
stable prices and a3per cent unemployment rate
appears somneivhat optimistic. Stabilization policy ef-
forts to achieve such a low rate of unemployment
could prove quite costly in terms of inflationary pres-
sures. Low rates of unemployment could be achieved
svithout aggravating inflation, however, by the adop-
tion of measures designed to remove constraints on
the functioning of labor markets.
This article examines the reasons for the occurrence
and duration of unemployment, and, given this analy-
sis, explores ways in which unemployment might be
reduced without generating excessive inflationary pres-
sures. The emphasis on unemployment reflects the
fact that over the past twenty-five years, the Com-
mittee’s 3 per cent unemployment rate target has
not been attained as often as the 2 per cent per year
price target (see the folloiving chart).
Unemployment has long been described as arising
from frictional, structural, and “inadequate demand”
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factors, along with wage-price inflexibility. More re-
cently, a theory of unemployment based on job in-
formation and relocation costs has emerged. This
article investigates the unemployment issue through
integration of these basic approaches.
The first section of the article explains why there
fs unemployment. The explanatiomm is facilitated by
spelling out conditions under which the unemploy-
mnent rate would be equal to zero. This euphoric
situation is developed to make a clear contrast with
the actual world in which some unemnployment in-
evitably exists. The underlying cause of real world
unemployment is the fact that job information and
relocation costs are positive. Next, a “norma!” unem-
ploymnent rate and the reasons for deviations from it
are explored.s- Time term “normal rate” of unemploy-
mnent does not imp!y that such unemployment is
either desirable or immutable, One of the principal
objectives of the advancement of the normal rate
concept is to determine methods of lowering such
a rate.
The second major section of the article outlines
ways in which the rate of unemployment could he
mThe “normal” unemployment rate, which has also been
termed the “natural” rate, the “warranted” rate, and the
“full employment” rate, is not a constant, but can vary over
a short period with changes in the institutional setting of
the labor market.
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reduced without aggravating inflation. The roles of
legislative, fiscal and monetary policies ivith regard
to employment are analyzed in this context. Finally,
the econometric mode! of this Bank is used in the
third section to examine possible future patterns of
economic adjustment to alternative monetary policies
designed to achieve the Committee’s economic goals.
The mnodel draws on data from a period in which
labor market restrictions were little different from
what may he expected in the near future. Through
simulation techniques, the model suggests that ac-
celerating inflation would be required to achieve and
nmaintain an unemployment rate near 3 per cent.
WHY UNEMPLOYMENT?
Unemployment is usually considered undesirable
from both the social and private points of view. Yet,
there has always been some unemployment. Con-
trasting a hypotimetical world in which there is no
unemployment, with the real world, in which positive
costs of information and relocation as well as fric-
tional, structural, and aggregate demand-related
forces combine to foster unemployment, should pro-
vide insight into the problem.
A World of Zero Unemployment
In developing an illustration of a hypothetical world
in which there exists no unemployment, that is, every-
Page 13FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER ¶971
one wlmo wants a job at the market wage rate has one,
we assume: (1) prices and nomninal wage changes are
correctly anticipated; (2) all labor is homogeneous;
and (3) theme are no mnarket imnpem-fections.
The correct anticipation of wages and prices mmmeans
that each flrmn and each worker has sumch know-ledge.
Wages and prices are flexible both umpward and down-
ward. Labor homogeneity imnplies that each worker is
like that of every- other in terms of sumclm factors as
skill, age, and sex, A perfect market is characterized
by complete, costless knowledge of job information
and unlimited, imnmecliate and costless ability to trans-
fer labor resoumrces from one job to another. There are
no artificial impediments to labor opportunities sumch
as a minimnum wage law or jo!) discrimination on a
nonprice basis. Markets are cleared instantaneously
under the assumptions of this simple snodel (see the
figure below) and, consequently, there is no unenm-
ployment. That is, all those ivho desire to ivork at the
prevailing wage rate are employed.
A downward shift in the demand for labor (hrotmglmt
about, for examnple, bya long—lasting drop in consumer
confidence) resumlts imi an excess quantity of labor sup-
plied at time existing wage rate, and an immnediate
decline in the wage rate occumrs to clear time mnarket.
The lower rate is imnmediately recognized by time
workers as being widespread, and there is a decline
in the total quantity of labor (in mmman—hours) worked.
The fall ism the qumantitv of labor worked mnay he re-
flected in fewer houmrs worked per emnployee or fewer
employees. If no workers decide to drop oumt of the
labor force and all accept the lower ivage, the !ower
qumantitv of manhours is reflected in fewer houmrs of
work per emnployee. Still, every worker who wants a
job at time lower wage can find one, and a state of full
emnployment is maintained commtinumousiy. Timose who
mnake the economic clmoice not to work at the lower
rate have left time labor fomce volumntarily and are not
considered unenmployed. An increase in the supply of
labor, due to a sharp increase in imnmmmigration, for cx—
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ample, is accomimpanied by a lower wage rate and a
larger total qumamitity of labor worked. Thums, in tins
assummmed world of perfect lalmor markets ammd no costs
of adjustmemmt, full employment is mmmaintained con—
timiuously. Althouglm the level of emmmployment may vary,
botlm the market (or actumal) rate of mmmmemmmpioyment
amid time normal rate are zero.
Underlying Cause of Unemployment
1mm contrast to) the hypothetical world imm whicim
timere is mio umnemnplovmmment, consider time real world
situation in which there is-always a positive rate of
unemployment.tm Tlmis positive umnemmmpioy-nment rate
emerges when the rigid assumptions of the “Zero
Unemployment World” are dropped. The following
Exhibit provides an overvieiv of the caumses of uneum-
pioytmmemit amid a classification of the sources. “Sources”
refers to the original reason for umnempioyment, tlmat
is, why unemployment initially occurs, and “causes”
is concerned! with its comitimmance, or why time unemn—
ployed indiyidumai cioes not immediateiy locate a job.
Time underlying cause of unemployment is the fact
that job infornmatiomi amid relocatiomi costs are positive.
Timis lack of perfect (costless) knowledge and mnobility
means that a worker seeking a job for ammy reason
(better pay, industry lay-offs, downturn in time econ-
onmy) cannot imimmnediateiy locate amid accept the best
employment for ivhich he is suited. So long as there
is sonic service he can perform ( wimetimc’r imm time pro-
fession or trade in which he is trained, or some other
ecomionmic services such as mmmanual labor) for some
positii-e wage rate, lie mmeed imot be ummemmmpioyed, hut
Ime cammmiot, imi general, discover his best eumpioymuemit
alternative without sonme costly period of search.
4
According to the Departmnent of Labor, “Unemployed per-
sons comprise all persons who did not work durimmg the
survey week, who made specific efforts to find a job within
the past 4 weeks, and who were available for work during
the survey week (except for tenmporary illness). Also in—
clusded as ummwnmployed are those who did not work at all,
were available for work, and (a) were waiting to be called
back to a job from which they had been laid off; or (b)
were waiting to report to a mmew wage or salary job within
30 days.” U. S. Depamtment of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Employment and Earnings (August 1971), p. 120.
Much of the followimmg analysis (especially those sections
on frictional, structural, and aggregate denmand-related
employnment) is oriented toward explaining the olmserved
ummenmployment rate as conmpumted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The costs of information and relocation analysis
applies not only to) this mneasure of “involuntary” unenmploy-
nment, hut also) to) voluntary ( or lmidden ) ummenmplomymmment
which is not accounted for in the observed unemmmploymmment
rate. in moany cases, labor market adjustment costs are so
high as to discourage potential workers fromum seeking jobs.
An estimate omf the significance of hidden unemmmploymnent
is provided by N. 3. Simnler and Alfred Tella, “Labor Re-
serves and the Phillips Curve,” The Renew of Ecooonmics
and Statistics (February 1968), pp. 32-49.
Dumrimmg die period of searcim lie is, by definition,
umnemploved.
Time foregoimmg passage is of sumfflcient importance
tom require re-statement, If timere is a service of any
kind an wimere which an ummmemmmp!oved immdividuai conic!
perfornm for an aboi-e—zero ivage, imis umnempioymnent
nmav he attrihumted to) timc’ fact timat ime lacks comimplete
kmmowiedge of all job possibilities or that ime does not
imave time resources to permnit him to reiocatc’. Time
ummemmmpioved miormimahiy prefer to seek jobs in fields in
which thc’v are skilled ammd imm favored geograplmicai
areas, hut after sommme period of fruitk’ss semirch, they
oftemi scale c!owmm timeir requiremmments -as to work field,
geograplmicai iocatiomm, amid/or wage rate.°
Since there are positive costs of informnation amid
mobility imm time labor market, the ummiemnpioyeci expend
scarce resources (timmie and money) to locate time
vacancy- timey- may evemmtuaily- fill. Comitrary to popular
Imehef, joim search (ivhich accompanies unemnploynment)
is a ratiommal economic decision wimicim often benefits
time worker, the firmmm, and the economnic system. The
worker is best off ( imi termmms of wealth <and ntility) by
ioeatimmg the job winch offers imimn the greatest present
valuc’ as cliscoummmted oi’er somne fimmite time span.°
By taking the first job he is offered, he may pass
ump jodms wlmicim would he umore rewardimig both mmmone-
tarily- amid mmomimmmonetarily over his working life. He is
mmmost aimie to obtain a preferable job by a search
process whicim often accoumpanies ummemploym<rmemit.7 If
tm
The significance of information and relocation costs in the
deternmination of unemploymmment is reflected in the description
omf the plight of an unenmployed husband and his wife in a
recent issue ofa poputlar magazine.
After a mnonth of fruitless job hunting, Tim
[layed off from his jomb as a toolmaker] and Rose—
nmary sat down to commsider their alternatives, lie
could take an unskilled jomb and supplenment it with
work in a tool shop. Rosenmary could go hack tom
work. They could move. None of the choices looked
good. For Tim to womrk 60 Imours for less than his
fomromer pay seemneol a drastic lmaekslide — Imesides,
he would have no) time to lomok for suitable work.
Rosemmmary wants to) he Imome with her childron, if
possible, at least until they’re all in school. Moving
would he a terrible sacrifice; -
Rollie Flochstein, “When the Pay Clmecks Stopped,” Good
Housekeeping (September 1971), p. 183.
CThe principle that the probability of a worker olmtaining the
“best” job by taking the first offer is lower than with additional
search finds its mmmirror inmage with firms and vacancies. A firm
has a higher probability of selecting time best applicant for a
vacancy by interviewing more than one applicant, despite time
fact that the vacancy must remnain open for a longer period.
<“Gathering and disseminating information about goods or
about oneself is in some circumstances more efficiently done
while time good or person is not employed, and tints able to
specialize (i.e., while specializing) in time production of infor—
rnatiomm.” Ammen A. Alchian, “Infornmation Costs, Pricing and
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Exhibit
Resource Unemployment,” Microecononmic Foundations of
Unemployment and Inflation Theory, Phelps, et. al, (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co.. Inc.. 1970), p. 29. A large lmody
of literature on the intensity and duration of joim search has
emerged in recent years. George J. Stigler, in “Infornmation
in the Lahmor Market,” Journal of Political Economy (Supple-
nment: October 1962), pp. 94-105, attempted to find the deter-
minants of worker’s wage demands and generated some data
which suggested that workers who invested in some job
search were imetter off than those who engaged in virtually
no search. Am-men A. Alchian and William R. Alien, in Uni-
versity Economics, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub-
lishing Company, inc., 1968), set down several postulates of
job search in their text, and Alehian, “Information Costs,
Pricing and Resource Unenmployment,” developed the theory
of job search and costs omf information more rigorously. Charles
C. Hoht, in “Job Search, Phillips’ \<Vage Relation, and Union
Influence: Theory and Evidence,” Phelps, et. al., related the
length of job search to wage aspirations, a concept given
more attention heretofore by psychologists than econonmists.
he is well satisfied with the job he takes, (1) his firm
will not have to advertise for and retrain a replace-
nmcnt for hium after a lmrief period of eumpioymemit; and
(2) society will receive the benefits of a worker who
is mmmore productive the mnore satisfied he is with his
position.
The search promcess is a two-way street — workers
search for jobs and firmmms search for workers. \Vorkers
expemmd resoumrces to secure inforumation about job
oppom-tumuties, amid! firms do time same to obtain informa—
tnmmm on the qualifications of job candidates. Trans-
Imortatiou costs are often a part of the search process
also. Firms may move plants near available labor
Unemployment Causes and Classifications
Not,< Samoa,,, <d,,p~<Uicct[o, inSe,,nt , it,,abo,o a,e,iptay’.,oom dkti,ciio,s
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sumppiy omr absorb the comsts of emimployee job trammsfer.
Workers, imomwever, omftemm mmmust bear time monetary and
mmommmmmommetarv costs of ombtaimung work in other areas.
The Normal Rate of Unemployment
Civen the ummderlyimg joim search costs, ombserved
unemmmploymmmemit derives frommm frictionai. structural or
aggregate demmmammd-reiated factors.8 In addition, the
observed umiemmmploymnemit rate mmmay be viewed as con-
sistimmg of a “nornmai” rate of nmmeumpioymemmt amid! devi—
atiomms fronm the normmmal rate. The level of time mmormai
rate is determimmed by frictiomial amid! structural forces
see time Exhibit). Time mmomrumal rate of unemmmp!oyument
reflects time adjnstmmment omf firmmms amid svorkers to chang-
immg ecommommmie commdtiomms independent of aggregate
demmmamid chmammges. Deviations frommm the nomrmal rate
mmmay he ascribed! tom cimauges imm aggregate deumammd
winch result imm overall prices--amid wages changing at
rates mmot correctly- ammticipated by firms ammd workers.
At the imormmmal rate of unemnpioymmmemmt, there is amm
equihbrinm of a particular sort imm the haimor mnarket.
Time equilibrium is mmot omme which exists imm time sense
timat time labor mnarket clears at a singie wage rate,
and there~are no excess supplies of or d!enmammds for
labor.
Equmilibriummm in time labor mmmarket at time mmormmmal rate
omf umneumphoyment is immdmcative of some average length
of searcim tinme before a vacancy is filled or, alterna-
tively, a jolm is takemmY This average length of job
search at time mmomrmmmal rate is a functiomm omf the olegree
omf imeterogemmeity and immmperfection in time jdmb mimarket.
1mm timis context, heterogeneity refers to the fact that
all womrlcers do mmot simare the sanme skills and! training,
mmomr do all job vacammcies require the samne qualifica-
tions. Jomb mmmarket inmperfections mmmean that there is
mmot perfect ( costless ) immformmmation about vacancies or
dlualiflcatiomis, costless mmmobility, or equal job oppor-
tummmities fomr workers with siomiiar jolm qumalifications.
‘lime mmormnal rate of unemnploymmment at ammy time is
imomt easily mmmeasured, lmut commceptualiv it can be de—
fimmeol as timat rate svhmich exists (given labor market
inmperfectiomms ammd imeterogemmeity) when wages and
otimer prices cdmmmfomu-mmm on average comrrectly with
ammticipations. Some firnms and! workers umnderestimmmate
price ammd! wage cimammges ammol sommie overestimnate, but
0mm average for time overall ecommomy, prices and wages
are correctly fomreseemm. Since the wage rate associated
with vacamicies at some flrmns will be below the rate
expected! imy some apphicammts, these apphcammts will
contimmue to search for imigher wages.1° During the
period omf search, tlmese particular applicants are un-
eumployed, and their unemployment constitutes the
mmormna! rate of ummenmpioynmemmt. Other applicammts, how-
evd’r, are pleasantly surprised that the wage rate asso-
ciated with a particular vacancy is higimer than they
ammticipated!. Their search tinme is shorter than the aver-
age associated! witim time norma! rate of unenmpioyment.
Whemm nonmimmal wages are risimmg faster than antici-
pated on average, job search tinme on average falls
ammd there is “over-full” employmemmt, that is, a fall in
ummmenmploymmment below the norma! rate. V/hen wages
are increasing slower than anticipated on average,
there is less thamm “full” eumploynmemmt, as unemployment
mises above time nonmial rate. Time normmmal rate itself
varies with chammges in the amount of frictional and!
structural unenmploymnent.
Frictional Sources of Unemployment
Workers who are unemployed for short periods due
tom ‘stammdiard market adjustmmments are frictiommmaily un—
o’mmmplomyed. Stand!ard mnarket adjustnmemmts refer to timomse
situmatiomms in whicim workers emmter the job market \vith
little experience, (limit jobs volummtarilv to lomok for
lmetter ommmes, omr are releasec! from emp!oynment d!ue
tom emmmphover—emnployee dissatisfaction, striko’s, seasonal
factors, or lmumsiness faihumres umnrelated to chammges in
aggregate or relative demand. Frictional unemploy-
ment, cimaracterized by a continumal cimurning of jobs
ammd womrkers, is basically immstitutiommal in that a so—
moThe expectation of a higher svage than is offered is also a
proxy for other reasons that a job seeker is not hired. For
example, in the cases of both frictional and structural un-
enmpioyment, the actual wage associated with a vacancy may
be zero for unomuahified applicants.
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8These are not perfectly separable categorizations, Imut for
expositional purposes, the generalization is useful.
0
Since there is not a uniform wage rate at which everyone
accepts cmnploynment, and nmarket clearance in the usual sense
does not occur, it is difficult to depict any sort of realistic
labor market equihbm’iunm with a static demnand-supply dia-
gram. Momreover, the equilibrium which exists at the normal
rate of unemployment is dynammmic and cannot he readily
analyzed within the diagrammatical framework omf comnpara-
live statics. The unenmploynment rate implied by the intersec-
tion of labor market demand and supply cnn-es is zero, a
figure not attained in an actual economy.
Holt, p. 58, umses the phrase “stochastic eopuhibriumn” tom
describe the near equality between the large flows of womrkers
intom mmnemnployment and from anenmployment over any peniomd.
lie pomints oumt that over the coumrse of a year, tIme sunm of quits
and layoffs is almommt equal tom the sunm of new hires and recalls-
Phelps, mm. 8, discusses eopmiIibrium in the nmma—Walrasian sense,
that is, labor mmmamket eqmmihihriummm “in the large” which omccurs
despite the existence of somme vacancies-and somme
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cietv’s laws — both those omf maim ammd mmature — govern
its do’gree. Time existemmce of frictiommai ummemplomvmmment
arises witim time reiaxatiommm mf omuly (mmmc’ of time assummmmp—
tiomns omao!e imm the discumssiommm omf time zero ummmenmplov—
memmt mmmoclel — ialmomr mmmarket imnperfectiomns.m
The fomiiomwimmg exammmphe iliustrato’s time immterplay of
frictional soumrces -amid search ammo! informatiomm comsts
imm hrimmgimmg aimomuit ummmemmmploymemmt. If a worker is re—
ieaseo! from imis jolm Imecaumse omf a strike 1mm aim inc!ustry
whicim sumpphes imis emimpioyer’s flrmmm with mmmatcriais, ime
probably will mmomt know wimetimer he camm get a simmmiiar
jolm mvith ammotimer firmn, or imm ammomthmer fieio!, or witim his
own firnm after the strike is ended. Timat is, he does
not have perfect job mnarket iufomrumation. He is tem-
porarily umnemphoyec! wimie seeking a similar jomim witim
ammotimer firmmm, or a different job in anotimer field, omr
waiting to be called hack to imis omid job. If he imad
commmpiete information on aH alternative empioynment
opportummities, he could take time best job situation, but
the absence of such infommation often requires costly
searchm and/or relocation. Strikes, bad weather condi-
tions. a jump in the nummmber of rammdommm busimmess fail-
ures, increased randonm worker entry, and worsening
overall emphoyer-enmpioyee relations lead to higher
frictional unemnphoymemmt anc! a higimer norumal rate of
unenmploymeimt (because frictiommal ummenmploymnent is a
nmajor comimponentof the normal rate of unenmployment).
Sucim ummemimplomymmient is basically a produmct of the
immstitutiommah settimmg of tlme labor mmmarket. Chammges imm
the immstitutiomms !o’aci to chamiges in the degree of fric—
tionai ummemmmpiomvmemmt. Simice immstitutiomms cimammge slowly,
frictional ummenmploymmment probably does mmot temmd to
vary a great deal. If, however, timere is a hong-hastimmg
ehammge in, say, labor haws wimicim affect time propensity
to strike, or wcatlmer commditiomms whicim permmmaimemmthy
cimammge raimmfail patterns, or commimmmummmicatiommms develop—
memmts which aiter jomb immformnatiomm costs, there \\Till
hkeiy Ime a permmmammemmt cimammge imm frictiommai ummemmiphoy—
mmmemmt ammo! time mmormmmai ummenmmploymmment rato’. Aggregate
stabihzatiomm policies could olo little tom alter ummemmmploy—
mmmemmt arising frommm immstitutiommmah sourcc’s.
Structural Sources of Unemployment
L~mmc’mmmpiomymmmemmt resuitimmg fronm shifts iii relative de—
mmmammcis for amid! supplies of labor is attributable to
structural factors, These shifts are omf sufficient mnagmmi—
tuo!e tom commmstitute a simock to the ecommmomnic systemmm,
as ompposeci to time steao!y cimurmmimmg tlmat marks fric—
mmComntjnuing the parallel with the zero imnemployment womrld
assumptions, structimral nnemploynment is nmarked by dissinmi-
larities among workers (lalmor heterogeneity), and imnemmm-
ploynment arising from aggregate demnand-related sources is
attributable to incorrect anticipatiomns of prices and wages.
Page 18
tiummal ummmemjmiomvmmmo’mmt. Relative oio’muammc!s chmammge due
to to’cimmmomlomgicai aclvammces, clmammges imm tastes, or dephe—
tiumm of a mmatural resourco’. Reiativc’ sumpphies uma
cimammgo’ with shifts imm particular categories of workers
sumeim as a large immereaso’ imm sixteemm-year—omio!s immitiailv
o’mmtering time iaimomr fomrce ) , nmimmimmmummm wage immcreases.
or chmammgc’s imm tho’ ability- of sommmme groups ( sucim as
ummiomms ) to) aiter timo’ supply omf iabomr iii particular
fmo’ids, Since time shifts imm o’ither o!emmiammoh or suppiv
and time oiegrc’o’ omf time shift ) are not inmmo’o!iately
evidemmt tom all womrkers, ummemnploymmmemmt ofte’mm arises as
ivomrko’rs (ammoi relative wages ) adjust to time simift,
Search comsts arc’ iumcurro’oh dnmrimmg the pc-nod of
adjumstmmm emit.
lmmstitumtionai factors are omftemm respommsibhe for shmifts
in haimor supply mnuclm as with cimammges imm frictional
umiemmmpioymmmemmt. A one—time—ommiy cimammge imm time imirthm
rate ( which affects the size of time labomr force sixteen
years lato’r ) omr mmiilitarv c’mmmphomvnment (which affects
tho’ civihamm labomr fomrce, ammo!, imm tumrmm, ummemmmploynment)
gives risc’ to tenmpomrarv eimanges in structural ummmemmm—
1mlomvmo’nt ammc! tho’ mmormmmah rate of ummemmmploymmmo’mmt. A
iomng-hastimmg chammge in timo’ hmirth rate ( dime to advammces
in birth contromi technology, fomr instammce) or military
requirenments (o!ue to war omr threats omf war) svomumlo!
temmc! to) have a lommg—iastimmg immfluiemmce ommi ummemplomyment.
Chammges iii rc’hative c!emnammoh, however, are mmomt
likely to) havo’ a permmmanemmt effect onm ummmemnplomymnent,
because time affecto’oh workers ex-emmtunhly adjust tom time
o!eumammoi shift. W’omrkers ivimo bo’commmme ummemnpiomyed be—
causo’ omf -a drop imi the demmmammd for timeir particuiar
skiH (clue tom. for immstaimce, technological advances or
chammges imm taste) mnay alter their skills omver timmme. Aisom,
a iommg—iasting simift 1mm demmmamid is likely to discomumrage
workers fronm entering time ficiol iii svimicim demmianol ole—
chimed. By way omf comntrast, timere is little on time somppiy
side timat sixteen-year-ohds, for example, can do tom en-
lmamce timeir empioymmmemmt oppomrtummities. Moreover,
womrkers eammnomt be “c!iscoumraged” fromm reaching time
age of sixteen. Examples of time demand and supply
simffts simould heip to illustrate uimenmphoyment caused
imy structural changes.
Shifts in relative demands for labor — Technomhogicah
ad!vammccs km time trammsportation indumstry bmave been
accommipammiec! by sumbstammtial slmifts in time demmmand for
particular types of transportation workers. The de-
mmiand for ferryboat operators, pony express riders, and
streetcar eommc!umctomrs has declined in the last century,
n-imihe to’cimmmomlomgicai ao!vammces have created a o!emmmand
fomr imims o!nivers, tm-nick drivers and commmmnerciah airline
pilots. 1mm somme cases, workers may be able to retainFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
jombs in timeir particular fiehcl Imy bomvenimmg thmeir wage
d!emmmand!s, hut imm omther instammces, jombs becommme unavaii—
almhe rc’garohhess omf time wage dechmme a worker is wilhimmg
to accept.tm2 The hatter is time mmmore likely case wimen
womrkc’rs’ wages-are a relatively snmall portiomm of time
omvenahl comst omf provio!immg a good or service. Lange
fixed (mmoniahon) comsts are typically chmanactenistic of
timo’ traimspomrtatiomi industry.
Imm timomse cases km which a worker could retaimm his
job lmv accepting a wage cut, ime will oftemm prefer to
ioomk ehsewhmere fomn emmmpioymmment imm his omwmm field or
take a job not imm imis primmiary field. He mmiay look for
a jomb reojuirimmg little or mmom skill (amid accept time commmi—
mmmemmsurateiy bmw pay) tom omhmtaimm emplomr-mmmemmt quickly
and or retrain hminmseif in ammotbmer field in order eventu-
ally to take a job payimmg skilled laimor wages.
\Vhemm a Imiacksmmmitim, railroad flremmmamm or fenmybmoat
omperatomr is tomid lie mnuist leave omr accept a pay cut,
ime mmiay mmot realize that ciemnano! for his particular
omccupatiomm bias fallemi em-enywimere, not just witimin his
omwmm firmmm. It mviii prolmabiy take himmm soimme period of
search tom io’ann that the fail in demnammd is pervasive.
Such ummemmm~mlomymmmemmt is gc’mmc’rally rc’clucc’cl omver timmie
as mvomrkers’ ac!apt tom time chammgecl compositiommm of ole—
nmand for their services. Hence, unemmmpboyment re-
sulting from a change in relative demands for iaimor
is temmmporary.
Time effect of time cimaimgc’o! commmpositiomm iii olemmiano!
eamm aisom ime iflustnatc’c! lmy commsiderimmg a eimaimgo’ in
tastes. If the public, through its rcpnesemmtativo’s in
govenmmnmemmt, clecicies to hewer its demammcl for
gomm-ermmmmmemmt-emmmplovec! engimmeers amid increase its
chenmammc! comrnespommclimmgiy for gom-enmmnment-o’omplomved
scimooml teacimers (aggregate demmmammd rc’mmmainimmg time
sammme ) , a likely result is timat ummeimmpioy-mmment ammmommg
c’mmgimmeers will risc’, as wiil vacancic’s imm thmo’ teachimmg
fleic!. Time cutback iii clemammcl fomr engimmo’ers is reflectc’c!
imm lmomth a less attractive wage amid fewer homurs omf
womrk reojumiro’o! imm timat field. If eacim emmgimmeo’r wero’
wiflimmg to take a mm-ago’ cut’tm anol ‘omr if each emmgiimeer-
tm
unemploymmment comnmpensation provides a partial lower Iinmit
for the wage cut a womnker is likely to comnsider,
mmAcceptance of a wage cut by enmployees may at first appear
sommmewlmat unrealistic, Imut workers in the recent lmast have
taken such emits tom avomid losing their jombs.
In recent months, such diverse groups as taxi
drivers in Cleveland, paper mill enmployees in New
York, and watclmmnakers in Pennsylvania have taken
pay cuts, sonic on a temporary basis, Now there’s
talk of wage-cutting amomng mmmany omf tIme 11,000
lmomunly womrkcrs at General Motomrs Corporation’s
Frigidaire Division in Dayton. It’s still toom early
to call wage—cattimmg a trend. But bomtlm umiomm officials
and comrpomrate labor o-mxperts iii a nunmimer of in-
dustries concede that if the economy stays in time
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immg firmn reduced time imouns omf work required equally
fomr all emmgineenimmg emmiployees, timere wonmid be no
eimammgo’ imm time mmumnlmer omf peompie emnpioyed in emmgi—
neenimmg. 1mm practice, however, time engineers will
1mromlmaimiy mmot neahze umtii after somme period of search
that time olechmme imm demmmammc! is not restricted to their
firom alommme, but is widespread. Also, time finns nor—
mmmafly- c!om mmot ask all timeir emphomyees to work say-, six
imomurs, immsteac! omf c’ighmt; the flnmmm accepts a reduced
nunibmc’r omf empiomyees working the full eight-bmomnr day.
Evo’mmtumailv, time emmgimmeers learmm omf time permmiamment
clechimme km clenmammcl iii tho’ir own field after somnme
lmeniomoi omf costly searchm, aimc! take employmnemit in otimer
omccimpatiommms fomn wbmichm timey may ime oiualified, or
retrain timo’immsehm-es to imecommmd, say, schomomi teachers.mt
The umnemployed engineers nmay mvehi have to move
fromm their hmommmme area, particularly if government de—
mlmammd! fomr engineers acconimted for a sizeabie portion
of jolms in timat area, to another iocatiomm to find
employ-ment.tmm After snmch adjustments they are once
again enmpioyed,
domldnmms, they may be forced tom join the list of
businesses that have already whittled pay checks.
Jim Hyatt, “Somme Workers Accept Pay Cuts as Alternatives
to Losing Their Jobs,” The Wall Street Journal (July 23,
1971), p.l.
miThe situation of the imnemployed toolmaker descrilmed in foot-
note 5 alsom provides amm illustration of the case in which
workers, after some periomd mmf unsuccessful search for work
in their own field, switch to other occupations. With his
nneomplomymnent lmenefits about tom run out,...” His lTim’s]
choice then mmiay be to take a job, any job, or go on relief.
He knows he will ehommmse to work. Meantime he has applied
for a job mmn the Trnmmibull police force. As a pomliceman he
will not approach his AVCO Lyconming salary, but the re-
spectalmility and security of that job appeal to himim. Further-
nmore, he expects tmmat the working homnrs will
1
leave time for
a secomnd job.” Hochstein, p. 184.
Aaomther exanmple is provided by the experience mmf recent
comllege graduates who have had difficulty lomcating jobs in
their field: ‘‘Most resist it, but sooner or later those [college
graduates) wlmo can’t land a desired pomsitiomn or one even
vaguely related to their field of study wind imp comnsidering
sommiething like secretarial womrk, driving a taxicab omr waiting
omn tables.” Can- Ronberg, “Many Comliege Graduates Jobless
After Trying for 3 Months,” St. Loni,s Post Dispatch (Sep-




There is sonic question as to whether a womnker who is quali-
fied fomn a vacancy in an area nomt immediately accessible to
him is frictionally or structurally nmnenmpioyed. Fromm the
womrker’s poiimt of viexv, if he nmust bear excessive nmomving
comsts, Ime is strncturally uneoiplomyed since the costs of reloca-
tiomn imiake him, in effect, unqumahfied ( omr imnavaibalmie ) fomr the
vacancy. Assumming the firm womuld cmiiploy the worker if he
ivene availalmie, they woimld probably consider Imim frictionally
mmnenmplomyed.
Structural and frictiomnal unenmpioyment are not only re-
lated to each other, bimt also to, aggregate denmand—related
uneniplomymnent. For examnpie, an expansiomnary policy action
wlmich fosters a higher level omf aggregate denmand alsom tends
to create mmmore job vacancies in au omccimpations. Increases in
vacancies will tend to lower stnumctural unemployment be—
cause tlmere will Ime, omther tImings equal, more vacancies for
which there are qualified job applicants.
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Shifts in relative supplies of labor — One immmpomrtant
way imm wimich ummemnpboymmment due to structural factors
is aggravated is throug!m himmiitatiomms omm the supply of
qualified! womnkens, At any timne iii aim ecomnommv, there
are workers in time laimor force wimo are ummaimie to
omimtaimm jcmbs imm a particular field because omf artificial
imarniers to emmtry. These workers (1) are dluahified tom
fill a vacancy, imut are kept fnommm flllimmg time vacancy
hi>’ ummiomms, fomrmmma! homimbying groups, loosely- organizeol
assomciatiommms omf womrkers omr “concerned! citizens,” or
(2) womuild be quahfieol tom fill the vacancy if it were
not for the hindrance of such groups.
Uimiomms, for exammiple, have sonic commtroi over the
size omf timeir mmiembersbmip. If timey were to restrict the
size omf their mnemhiersbmip, they would be able to en-
imaimce time wage earnimmg power omf time current mem-
lmers.mo To see hmomxv the abihity tom restrict iaimor affects
unemployment, take time example of a carpenter
newly arrived! fromm auomther country. If ime is pro-
imibited fromn eimteniimg time local union, amid if the
ummmiommm comntromis mnomst of time carpenter jobs ( thmat is,
detenommimmmes wimom fills the vacancies ammo! homw many
vacancies mviii be left temporarily unfiuleo!), he will
mmomt Ime able tom obtaimm work as a carpemmter immneo!i -
atehy. As a result, time imnmigrant carpenter is nmm-
c’mmmpboyed! while he attempts to enter time ummiorm, seeks
imonumomion work km bmis own fielc! locally omr iii omthmer
commmmmunities, omr seeks womrk in omther fie!c!s, \Vithm uniomn
commmtromi omf vacaomcies imeiomg commtinuailv d’mmcomummtered
lmy different workers over time, there nmay ime at any
timmie some ummemmiploymemmt attnilmumtaimie tom ummiommm in-
fluence. Structural nmmmemnpboynment and time nomrmal rate
omf ummempiomyruent may rise with an increase iii ummmiommm
almihity to control jobs and fall with a clechome in that
ability.
The prevention of blacks, womneu and others by any
group frommm gakmimmg o1uahficatiomms for work through
training programs may also be iaterpm’eted! as giv—
immg rise to strumctumrah ummmempiomymemmt. If the womrker
word’ permnittc’d tom immcrc’ase omr upgrade imis womrk skills,
imo’ couhcl fimmcl mimomre vacammcies fomr wimichm ime womumid lie
quahfleci and, o~uitehkeiy, reduce imis unemnpiomvmmmemmt
sc’areh timmme. The comsts omf searcim ummo!erlie umnemmmploy—
‘
6
Nom attempt is mmiade here tom cmiticize uniomns omr an>’ other
gromumps. l’he pomwer tom comntromi lalmor supply domes miot mieces—
sarily mimean such pomwer is inevitaimly exercmsed. Weagree
with the Comminmittee fomr Ecomnommmmic Devebompmmment that “Uniomos
should he ahmle to give adequate exprcssiomn tom the legitinmate
interests of their mmieamlmers, At the same time, steps must be
taken to ass,mre that they do) nomt have excessive pomwers tom
restrict the supply omf lahmomr thm’ough such means as omutdateol
apprenticeship requirenmemits omr racial discriminatiomn, mmomr time
power to place mmndue m-estrictiomns mm promductivity immmprove—
meats.” Conmmittee for Ecomnonmic Develoimnment, Further
‘Weapons Against Inflation (Nomvemher 1970), pp. 18-19.
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mmmemmt arising from frictional, structural, or aggregate
demammd-nelated sources.
Uniomms are miot the only groups who may effectively
curtail job entry. The practice of licensing job apphi-
cammts tom immsure timat qumahtative standards are met is
accommmipammieo! b the pomwer tom comutno! emitry. Those in
charge omf time hcensimmg are omfteim affihatecl with the
gromup in wimoso’ immterest it is to hinmit the supply of
womrkers. Thmese gromups nmay range froni c!omctors to taxi
c!niyc’rs. One analyst, fomr example, feummc! evidence
stmggestiag cliscrimmmiimatiommi by domctons against aolmnitting
Jews to mnedicai schools for fear they nmight become
price cutters,’’
Besides licensing, other legal means of curbing the
effective supply of workers include such laws as na-
tiommal and state mninimnumn wage reguiatiomns. These
iaws are designed to set a floor under particular wage
rates, but a side effect is a tendency to aggravate un-
empioynment. A young, inexperienced worker entering
the lahomn force for time first time might be able to con-
tribute somnething to time value of a flrmn’s output, but
if imis comntnihmution tom time fm-mu is not worth time mmmininium
wage, he is not likely to be emnployed. The young
womrker mnay evemmtualby find a jomb, bumt the temmdency
omf time baw is tom iengtimen ins search tinme beyond what
it womulcl lie without the law. That is, it is an addi-
tiommmai factomr temiding to lengthen his search tinme, and
commmsequemithy, his pc’riomcl omf uimempboymmment. Thus, an
immcrease imm time mnimmimmmummm wage (so homig as it is higher
timami time valume of time womrker’s contnibutiomm to the
fm-mn) immcreases time normimal rate of uomemnpioymmient.
Timomse mnost aciversc’ly affected by time mmmimiimnuni wage
are time yomumag, the omid, time dlisahied!, time uneciucateci
and the disadvantaged.’8
i’iRemmhmen A. Kessel, “Price Discrinminatiomn in Medicine,” The
Jonrmmal of Law and Economics (October 1958), pp. 20-53.
tm
In profitable periomds. firnms miiay hire such workers tom inmprove
their immmage, buot dimring cyclical downtimrns, these workers are
often the first to he released. Milton Fniednman and Yale
Bromzen, in “The Mininmama Wage Rate — Who Really Pays?
An Interview with Yale Prom-en and Nhiltomn Friednman,” Free
Somciety Assoeiatiomn, Inc., (Washington D. C., 1966), contend
that the minimmmunm wage has a stromng adverse effect on black
mmnemnpiomyment rates. Other evidence of possihmhe deti-immmemmtal
mmmimminmiommm wage effects omn uaemmmphomymument has Imeen fomnad by
John M, Peterson, “Emmmplomy’mmment Effects omf State Mininmunm
Wages fomr \Vomnsen: Three 1-listonical Cases Re-exammmimmed,”
Industrial a,mcl Labor Relation-v Review (April 1959), pp.
406—422; Celia D. Cammmphmefl amid Roseimmary C- Catmmmpbehl,
“State Mimmiimium Wage Laws as a Cause omf Unemimplomyimment,”
Southern Economic Journal (April 1969), pp. .323—332; H.
NI. Douty, ‘‘Sommmme Effects omf the $1.00) Miniaiummi Wage imi
tIme Uaiteol States,” Ecomoonmica (May 1960), pp. 137-147;
Arthur F. Burns, The Marmagement of Promxperity ( Nexv Yomrk
Comlimmmmlmia Uimiversity Pm’ess, 1966); amid! William J, Slmknrti
and Ieltomn Xl. Fleishcr, “Emplomymmment and Wage Bates in
Retail Trade Smmlmseomaeat tom the 1961 Amnendmmments omf theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1971
Time nomrmmmai rate omf ummemphovmiieimt, in summmmmmary,
temmchs tom rise with immcneases imi infomrmmmatiomu ammdl mmmovimmg
comsts, ummammticipated chamiges in tastes ammo! tecimnomhogi—
cal clevebompmmmeomts, amic! certain shifts imm time supply cmf
haimomr. Timese factors imelp explain time existemmce omf a
m’ariaimbo’ mmomrmah rate omf ummemmipiomymiment, hmut deviatiomus
fnomm time nomrnmai rate itself can hmest lie expiaiue!
liv’ charmges in aggregate c!emmiamioi,
Deviations From the Normal
Rate of Unemployment
If aggregate demanc! is rising at a steaciy nate such
that wages ammd prices arc anticipated! correctly on
average (scmmne cmverauticipation and some under-
anticipation), unenmpioymnent is defined tom he at its
nomrmal rate, and thmere exists a state of equihbriumm “in
the harge.” Policy actions which slow the rate of
gromvth of aggregate demand, so timat wages (and
prices) rise less on the average timan anticipated,
cause unempioyment to rise above the normnal rate.
These actions, bike shifts in the relative demands
for and supplies of mvorkers, are omf sufficient mag-
nitude to constitute a shock to the economic sys-
team. Policy actions mvhicim stimumlate the rate omf
gromvth of aggregate demand, so that wages (and
prices) rise faster on the average than anticipated,
push unempioyument below tbme normal nate. These
twom cases are explored more fully below.
Unemployment Above the Normal Rate
Starting at a commditiomm of equihbniuumm imm time lange
with ummemmmpboymmient at the nomrmal rate, time sbomwimmg
omf aggregate demmi;muc! growth by, for iimstammce, restric-
tive mmmomietary actions, results iom a ohc’chimme in the
demmmammci for labor. Emnploycrs at first niay reduce
omutput by cuttimmg hack omvertime amid not flihimmg m’acan—
cio’s created by nomrmmmai attrition. If time slowing of
aggregate demammo! is mmmore timami tenmporary, emmmpiomyers
mviii imave tom reduce output ammo! their wage imihh hmy
dismmmissing workers omr possihmhy askimmg timemmm to accept
Fair Labor Standards Act,” Southern Economic Journal (July
1968), pp. 37-48. Criticisnm omf such studies usually has
emphasized that the causes of unemophoynment are difficimit tom
unravel, and that the statistical techniomues emmmphomyed to do
sOm are inadequate.
The minimuon wage also has the potential tom aggravate
inflation, since raising prices is one alternative which firnms
have to meeting increased labor costs. Finns may meet the
rise in hahmomr costs caused by the mmmimmimnum wmmge—wimich often
fosters an upward shift in the firm’s whole wage structure
— by reducing profits, increasing efficiency, raising the prices
of their products, reducing the quantity of labor worked, or
any conmbinatiomn of these. Finmms which, fomr variomus reasomis,
are achieving low profits, or already are operating at peak
efficiency, would have only the options of increasing unenm-
pboyment or prices. The increase in prices would lie per-
manent if validated by expansive policy actions.
iomxver mvages. Because they do not hmave complete
information on iabor niarket conditions, mnany workers
mviii seek emmmpbomymmment at timeir earhier, higher mvage
level and will not discover for sonic time that overall
prices and wages have fallen.
Pried’s mmmay well fail relative tom mvages ( aim immcrease
in the real wage rate) iuitiahiy, because mvage con-
tracts are often of a longer-run nature than commod-
ity prices.’9 A rise in the reai wage rate (a bag omf wage
chammges after price cimaimges) is nomt miecessary for an
immerease imm ummemmmpbomvnient. All that is necessary is a
lag in mvorkers’ realization of the fact that a wide-
spread o!echne imm the o!emand for baimomr imas occurred.
Time comsts omf imcquiring immformmm;mtiou ahmout job vacan-
cies increase for workers, since employers will have
redumced their omutbays, sucim as advertising, for recruit-
ing nemv employees. Unemp!oymmment, which rises mvith
the increased costs of information, will continue to
rise untii mvorkers decide to accept employment at time
new, iomver money wage rateY°The mvorkers, as a
whmohe, revise their mvage expectations downward over
the penioud of immcreased unemployment less than in
proportion to the actual fall km wages.2m
Nomt until anticipated wage (or price) changes
equal, on average, actual wage (or price) cimanges,
‘
9
The cyclical relation between employment and the real wage
has long been
0
f concern to economists. Keynes assunmed an
inverse relationship between enmployment and the real wage,
but subsequent empirical studies promvided little support fomr
his thesis. See Ronald C. Bodkin, “Real \yages and Cyclical
Variations in Emplomyment: A Re-Exanmination of The Evi-
dence,” Canadian Journal of Econonmic.v (August 1969), pp.
353-74, Barro and Crossoman synthesized the work of Patinkin
and Cbower to develop a macroecomnonmic nmodel in which
imnempboyment nmay be explained witimoat resort to real wage
niomvements. Robert J, Barro and Herschel I. Cromssnman, “A
Ceneral Diseqaihibriamim Model of Income and Emmipiomyment,”
The Anmerican Economic Review (N-larch 1971), pp. 82-93,
Nomte that real wage changes are not an essential feature of
the analysis given above, but provide a supplementary cx-
planatiomn omf cyclical unenmplomynment, The hag in workers’
realizations of a pervasive change in aggregate demand
behind the actual change is the essential feature,
tm0
The failure of workers tom realize the pervasiveness of the
decline in denmand fomr their services is often interpreted to
represent a “money illusion” on the part of the workers. The
fall in prices xvii have increased their real (price-deflated)
wages, but hmecaase momney mvages have fallen, workers will
prefer to contimmae iob search rather than initially accept the
lomwer wages. There need he no irrationality on the part of
thomse who continue their jomb search: they simply lack the
complete inforamation on which to base iob search decisions.
Time acquoisitiomn of that information is often costly and time
consuming.
mmSoime workers become discouraged enough ahommt the wage
and emnployament situation to drop out of the labor force
and accept heisomre instead, On the other hand, somme mem-
bers of the household who dmm nomt normally womrk fomr wages,
such as housewives and stmmdents, will enter the labor force
during slack periods to augment the householol’s income,
The evidence on balance indicates that moire workers are
discouraged fromm working in a slack labomr mimarket than are
encomuraged to work. See Simmiher and Tehla, pp. 32-49.
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will ummmeimmpiomvmiment retunmm to time norimial rate. Stabihi—
zatiommm at time mmormmmal uimemmiphmymmmemit rate wihi occur
evemmtuabbv ummiess monetary growth, amid imemmce aggre-
gate old’mmmammd, mmot ommmiy c!echmmes but commmtimmual!y ole—
ceberates so that, omm am-erage, actuab wages contkmuoalhy
fail faster thamm expectec! wages.
Unemployment Below the Normal Rate
Witim ummemmm~mioymmmemmt immitialby at time mmormmmal rate,
amm immcrease imm t!me rate of gromwth omf thmc’ mmicmmmo’y stomck
will immcrease omutput, 1)1-ices ammci the c!emimammcl fomr labomr.
Immitiaihy, nmommmey wages rise mnomrc’, ommm am’c’rage, timamm
ammticipatech, thmereby promvic!immg time immducemneut fomr tIme
ummemn1iloyed to stomp their search earlier thaom piammned.
Time shomnter average jomh search timmme is accomnpaniec!
byafaib imm ummemmmpiomymemmt heloiw time mmormnal rate.
Aisom, so’arehm comsts tcm womrkers dec]iue as firmmms, recruit-
imig momne aggressively thaim before time immcrease in
aggregate oiemnanch, alisoirim mmmomrc omf time searcim eomsts
timan pneviomushy. Iirices immay rise faster initially thamm
wages (real wages decline), ammol ummaimy workers evalu-
ate the mmew, hmighic’r umommmey wages at time ohc! price
bevel.
Ummemmmphomv’mnemit will remimaimm beiomw time omomrmmmab rate
until workers coirrectby ammticipate, ommm average, thmc’
kieneases km price’s ammo! wages. W~it!mthe rc’a!izatiomm
timat a wide—spread imicrease in the o!emimammd fomr thmeir
sc’rm’ices imas omccurredh, mvomrkers wibi becomne mmiomre seiec—
tivo’ imm appraisimmg jomb omifers (tom omlmtaimm time Imest oume),
average searcim timmme will rise ammch ummemmmphoiymmient wihi
rise tom tIme mmomrmmmah rate. Scm hong as the mmummmetanv
expammsiomn domes nut commtimmuaihx’ accelerate, workers
will evemmtmmahhv c!emanc! mnommc’y wago’s ao!o’oiuato’ tom
coimmmpemmsate timemmm for time rise imi iiriees. Real xvages
return to their earhien iem’eb ammd emmmploivers mmom lommger
fiimc! ac!clitiomma! labior resources attractive. Gromvtim imm
the demmmaomcl for baboir fails amid! unemmmploivmmmemit retuums
to its mmomrmnal rate.
Ommly if memmetarm’ gromwtlm accebo’rates will ammtici-
pateol wages cemmtinume tom immc’rease less, omm average,
timan actual nmommo’y mv-ago’s. Ummc’nm1mioynio’mmt can lie kejmt
biebommm- time mmormai rate imm this xm’av, limit time comst of
cm mmmtinuec! mmmommmetarv accehc’ratiomm is thmc’ commtinuiecl ac—
tmm
Studies suppmmrting the “acceleraticmaist hyprmthesis” can he
found in Mihtomm Friedimman, “Time Role of Monetary Policy,”
T/me American Economic Review ( Marclm 1968), ii. 10; Ed—
mmmomnd S. Phelps, “Money Wage Dynaumics anol Labor Market
Equihibriumm,” Phelps, et. al.; and Rolmert E. Lucas, Jr. amid!
Leonard A. Rapping, “Price Expectations mind the Phillips
Cvmrve,” American Economic Review (June 1969), pp. 342-
50. Some adolitiomnal empirical evidemmee is promvided in the
final section of this paper. For an omppomsing view, see Itoimert
M. Soiomw, Price Expectations and the Behavior of t/me Price
cc’leration of price rises.2’ The comst of red!ucimmg job
so’archm timmme loin a somali mnimmcmmity of tmmmemnpioved is
excessive immfiatiommm for all. Job searcim time’ for sumcIm
a gnomnm1m can lie rc’oluceci by ommore efficiemmt mmiethmods
tbmamm mimommetary acceleratiomm. as mviii be dliscnssecl below,
LEGISLATIVE, FISCAL AND MONETARY
POLICIES TO REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT
Legislative ammo! allocative fiscal actions camm best be
used to lomm’er the’ rmormmmal rate of ummemmmp!oymmmemmt, ammd
mmmemmetary actions camm foster a stable climate for prices
consistemmt mvitbm a ~irevai1immg mmomrnma! rate omf uumemmmploy—
mmiemmt.2i Legislative ;mctiomns wimicim womtoio! reduce me—
mmompehstic pcmwers of employers ;mmmcl ummiens in a woirld
hi wlmicim time costs of infomrmmiaticmim are pomsitim’e wouid
temmd tom bommx’en time mmommmmmai rate omf uimemnpboymmmeimt.
Stm’mmmmgen lc’gislatiommm tom ehmmmimmate jomb discrknimmation
omm mmommmprice groummds ammd immmprove time overall fuimc-
ti ommmimmg of Ialmor mnarkets are exammmpbes omf actions which
coiuhoh lie taken by law-mmmakimmg bomolies tom immiprove the
eompioiy’immemmt omutlomok. Legislatiomn tom ummitigate time neg—
atim-’e empboymmmemmt impact of time mmmimmimmmuumi mm’age mvould
lie particularly !melpfub to the yoiummg, the olc!, the
ioexpenic’mmcecl, ammo! time o!isadvammtaged.
Aibomcative fiscal pombicies comubo! be cmriented tomward
bowenkmg time mmomrmmmai rate of ummemmmpiomyment by trans—
fernimmg gomm’enmmnmment nesoumnces frommm a sector distantly
related to emmipbovmnemmt, sucim as fomreign aid, to olirect
o’mmmpioivmmmemmt ;mssistammce. Omme way omf iomwerimmg time nor—
mmmab ratc’ womulol be thireumgim actiomnms c!esigmmed to lower
timo’ comsts omf immformmmatioiim amid jomb transfer.24 Job infer—
Level, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p.
17; and Rohmert J, Cordon, ‘The Recent Acceleration of
Inflatiomn and Its Lessons fomr the Future,” Brook-hogs Papers
on Economic Acticity (1:1970), pp. 8-47.
2m
Allocative fiscal actiomns are these designed to affect activity
in a particular sector omf the economy; aggregative fiscal
actions are taken to influence overall activity-.
2! Since umnemmmplcmymmiesmt associated with changes in aggregate
demand is also mmltimately related tom infommation and mom—
bihity comsts, a decline in these costs comald heljm to) lomwer
aggregate demand-related unemployment. Under certain con-
ditions, however, lovver informatiommi comsts amy imot lomxver
uaemploiyment. See Phelps, etal., p. 18. Covernnment-
sponsored progranms tom promvide statewide information on iob
vacancies are currently operational in a ammmher of states.
Not enough experience with time programs has yet been
gained tom assess adequately their comntnibutiommm to employment
assistance.
Other lmrolmomsals which wouk! have time effect of lomvering
the nomrniai rate omf unemmmploymmment have heen introduced by
time “Report of the Joint Ecomnoimmmic Commmmittee, Cmingress of
the Uimiteci States, on time Felmrsmary 1971 Econmonuc Report
of the President,’’ amid time Comummuittee for Ecoimmoimmic Deveiomp—
amemmt, Further %Veo~mousAgainst Inflation ( Noivember 1970),
p. 18, The Joint Econonnc Comommittee relies strmmngly urn a
~irompcmsal for a price—wage rex-ic” lmmmard tom maintain stalmle
prices in the face omf high enmploymnent, However, there is
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mmmatiommm imammks, trainimmg outlays and rebomcatiemm subsidies
comubo! nec!uce time search timmme of womrkens bietween
jomims ;mmmd! pomssibiy immcremmse the rate omf gromwth omf in—
commime imecause omf a moire efficient utilization of re-
somurces. Sucim pohcies tom reoluce thme mmonnmai unemnp!oy-
mmmemmt rate mmc’o’o! mmomt cause infiatiomn.
Inflation, as discussec! in time pneced!immg sectiomn,
results wimen mommmetary actions are takeim whmiclm pusim
time immarket rate of unempboymemmt lielow time nor-
mal rate. Stimulative monetary policies may lie ap-
propriate mvhen resources are underutibized and the
mnarket rate of unemployment is above the normal
rate, but the temporary emmmpbeynment gakms achieved
by monetary actions when unemp!oynment is already
at the norma! rate are offset by rising prices. Exper-
ience of time last two decades indicates that the use of
mmmemmetary actions to reduce unemployment whemm it is
aimomm’c the mmornmab rate nuns the risk of creatimmg infia-
tiommary pressures. First, there is imot sufficient knomvi-
edge mvith regard to the existing bevel of time mmonnmai
rate at any pomint in time, and second, stimulative
monetary pomlicies often have been carried on too
long. Therefore, the proper robe of nionetary pmmhcy
is the creation of an atmosphere of stable prices,
wimibe fiscal and legislative actions can be taken to
iomver the normab unempioymnent rate.
The nonmnal rate of unenmp!oynment nmay rise in the
mmear future unbess legislative and fiscal actiomns are
taken tom counter such a tendency. In the decade of
the 197O’s, an increase in the supply of available
labor is expected because of time increase km the popu-
lation of labor force age, nmuch omf which wilb be
attributable to young people.23 Also, increases in
labor force participation rates, particulanby woimen
anc! mmonwhites, and expecteol reductions imm nmilitaiy
cails omf dnaft-;mge mmmbes will temmc! to immcnease time
civiliaom babomn fomrce. Attenmptkmg to bower time ummemmi—
pbomymmmemmt rate timnomugh mmmommetary- actiomns’ -afimmie entaibs
the risk of gemmeratimmg immflatiommiany pressures.2m°
little evidence that such incomes policies could exercise
mmmch long-lasting restraint on prices-amid wages, especially
during periods of high employnment. See Lloyd Uinman and
Robert J. Flanagan, Wage Restm-aint: A Study of Income
Policies in %Ve,stern Europe (University of California Press,
1971), especially pp. 223-8. 23
’j’he popu!atiomn omf womm-king fomrce age 16 tom 24 years em
1
is
expected to increase in the 19
70
’s at a rate fasten than dar-
ing the 1945-60 period but slomwer than daring the 196O’s,
The population of such yommng people actually declined in
1952 and 1953, mvhen the mmverail unempioynment mate last
reached the 3 per cent level, The smnemaploymmment rate fmmr
womrkers aged 16 tom 24 averages much higimer than the mmverall
mmnempioymmmeat rate. Since males hetween the-ages omf 25 and
54 are designated ‘primary workers,” the young peompie are
a part of the large group often terimmed “secomndary workers.”
tm6
The appropriate degree to vvhich mammmmetary actiomns nmay lie
used to reduce unemployment without aggravating inflation
is primarily a function of time amount of unemploynment
LIMITATIONS OF MONETARY POLICY
IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
JEC GOALS
The use of iegisiative. aihocative fiscah, and mnone-
tary pomlicy actiommms won-king toget!mer js required to
attaimm such amnbitiomus goals as those advanced by time
Jomimmt Ecomnommmic Comnmmiittee. Thme fact tlmat legislative
ammo! allomcative fiscal actioimms to iowen the normnal rate
omf ummemmmpiovmmmemmt mmmay be pomhiticai!y unpopular (such
as actions cunimimmg time emnpiomynment influence of unions
ammo! mmiimmimmmummm mvage laws ) teomds tom timrow the burden
of achmieving timese two adminahie economic goals on
mnmmnetary policies alone. In order to obtain some quan-
titative estinmate of time implications of altering price
and enmpioyment momvements thmrough nmonetary actions
;mionme, it is useful tom emnploy an ecommmomnetric mmmodei
mm’imichm ;mibomws fomr tIme immmpact omf immommetary actions.
Time ecommmometric nmodel of this Bank permmiits the
amanipuiation of monetary variables to influence un-
emphoymiment and prices. The model has been cx-
plaimmec! in full detail eisemvimere.2~Basically, nmoimetary
and fiscai actions (aggregative fiscal actions, not a!-
locative) exercise an influence over prices and un-
emmmpioymmment in time mmmodei by aiterinmg the course of
tomtai spemiding relative to thme ceonommmy’s productive
potemmtiah. Chammges in the rate of growth of the money
stock imave a positive nmultiplier effect on the economy,
wimile time net effect of aggregate fiscal actions alone
mm total spendkmg over time is mmegligihie. Price an-
ticipatiomns are ami imnportaimt feature of the model,
formmming a part omf the himmkage lmetwcen total spending
ammd its division betmveen current prices and output.
Chammges in actual omntput relative tom potemmtia! omutput
provide estimates of the unenmp!oynmemmt rate.
traceable to aggregate denmand influences- The discussion of
actions to loxver anemplmmymmmemmt related to aggregate demand
as opposed to anenmplomynment fostered by frictional and struc-
tural factors finds historical precedent in the “Structural
Unemploynment vs. Insufficient Deumand” controversy of the
early 1960’s. See, for example, Richard Perinman, Labor
Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969), pp.
167-196; and Eleanor C. Cilpatnick, Structural Unempbomj-
nie,mt and Aggregate Demand (The Johns Hopkins Press,
1966).
27
See Lemmmmalh C. Andersen and Keith M. Canlson, “A Momne-
tarist Model for Eco,nommmic Stabilization,” this Review (April
1970), pp. 7-25; and Roger W. Spencer, “Population, The
Labor Force, and Potential Osmtput: Imnphicatiomns for the St.
Lomomis Model,” this Review (February 1971), pp. 15-23. This
econoometric momdel is basically a reduced form nmodel in that
it does not develop strmmctura!iy variommms subnmarkets of the
economy. such as the labomr niarket fomr aggregatiosm. Lahor
market imperfections can be captured liy a redmmced form
nmomdel, however, as well as by a structural nmodel. The model
does not have the capability to capture the effect of partic-
ular legislative and fiscal actions oil unemployment and
prices. For examimple, actiomns to lmmxver the costs of information
to workers cannot lie shos,vn with this nmodel, nor is it likely
that such actions could be reflected adeqimately by other
models.
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Various mmionetary policy alternativai.s were at-
tempte.d through stammdard simulatiomm rocediures to
attaimm si;nultarmeouslv time joint Ecommonmmic Gommomittee’s
3 per ce.nt unemploynment and 2 per ce.mmt per year
price goals, These twin objectives could mmot lime,
achievoid at tlme same time omyer tlme arlmitrariiy selected
1971-85 pn.~riod. gi.ven the curre.nt i.nitial economic
conclitiommms, Time goals, however, could be re,ached
~.odn’mduai1v, Si.nmce unemployment consi.derations have
imeerm. of donnkmant commmcerrm jim timis article, time attain-
nment of a 3 per cemmt ummcmplovment rate was gne/a
priority io. the following simulation.
lt is mi.ecessary te’ allow sonIc reasonable perioici of
ti.nme for urme.nmplovm emmt to reach approximately 3 per
cent of the labor fomnce, hmecause a wide gap imetween
poitemmt~aia.smd real output exists in. mmmi.d-1971. increases
in time nmoney supply at a 10 tier cent asmnual rate.
from H/1971 tom IV,/1975, a period of approx;nmateiy
four years. foster a steady declimme jim tIme unemnpioy-
mmment rate fronm 6 per cent in 11/1971 to 3.4 pen cent
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in IV/1975 (high-enmployment Government expendi-
tures were estimated to 11/1972 and assumed to grow
at an 8 pen cent rate timereafter fomr all simulations).
“Appropriate” manipulatiomns imm time rate of growtlm of
tlse nmoney stock from 1975 to 1985 pernmit time model
to genmerate unenmmploymnent rates within a narrow
range (2...6 pe.r cent tim 3,4 per cent) near time emmsplcmy—
mmment olmjective for term years, Tlme attainmemmt of this
goal requires aceelcratimmg nmmmnetary growth from a
10 per cermt nnmmuai rate in 1975 to a 44 per cent
anmrai rate at the end of 1985 (see the above chart for
time rates of cimammge irm the. money stock) -~ Time price
k,se/i, according tcm the simmmuiation, immereases at a 41
per cent annual rate at time emmci of 1985. Acceleratimmg
mnoncstanv gromwtlm leads to acce.ierati.mmg inflation — a
situatiomm in which actual price rises continue to exceed
28
hitthe significance should he attached to exact figures such
as “44 per cent” for a fifteen-year simulation, The important
aspect of this simnolatioa is that accelerating monetary growth
and irmfiatiomm are required to maIntain a3per cent mmcm-
ployment rate.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
anticipated rises — to keep the actual unemployment
rate below some “normal” rate.
Other alternative simulations which take into ac-
count the JEC price goals are explored in the ap-
pendix. The price goal of 2 per cent per year is
sought after varying degrees of price anticipations
are permitted to develop. The results of these simula-
tions suggest that if inflation, as well as unemploy-
ment, is deemed an important policy goal, it is far
better (in terms of lost employment and output) to
attack inflation as early as possible to halt its mo-
mentum and curtail inflationary expectations.
SUMMARY
The reasons for unemployment and ways to im-
prove the unemployment situation were explored in
this article through the we of an analytical frame-
work based in large measure on the fact that costs of
information and job transfer are positive. The con-
clusion reached is that the normal rate of unemploy-
ment can be lowered by appropriate allocative fiscal
and legislative actions; monetary actions are best
used to stabilize prices at the lower normal unemploy-
ment rate.
Positive costs of Information and resource mobility,
nonprice labor discrimination, and legal constraints on
the supply of labor such as minimum wage legislation
have curtailed the quantity of labor worked in the
past and will, quite likely, continue to do so in the
future. Moreover, expected increases in the supply of
secondary workers at a rapid rate over the next dec-
ade suggest shifting the target rate of unemploy-
ment above, rather than below, 4 per cent, unless
legislative and allocative fiscal actions are taken to
The aim of the following simulations of the econo-
metric model of this Bank is to obtain some idea of
the costs of stopping inflationary pressures at various
stages of build-up. These costs may be measured
approximately by the degree and duration of the rise
in unemployment accompanying a fall in the rate of
price inflation to the JEC’s goal of 2 per cent per year.
We may allow for the possibility that after taking
actions to achieve the Committee’s 3 per cent un-
employment goal, the cost in terms of inflation will
become sufficientlyhigh for policymakers to altertheir
focus from the unemployment goal to price stability,
Byassuming that inflation costs have become exces-
sively burdensome by 1980 (after 5 years of 3 per
cent unemployment and a peak 14 per cent rate of
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curtail labor market costs and restrictions.2~’ With such
legislative and fiscal actions to supplement monetary
actions, a rate of unemployment below 4 per cent
might be achievedand maintained without generating
strong inflationary pressures.
Given current labor market conditions, it was not
possible to reach simultaneously the Joint Economic
Committee’s twin goals of 3 per cent unemployment
and 2 per cent annual rise in prices using simulations
of this Bank’s econometric model with alternative
monetary policies. Attainment of the 3 per cent un-
employment rate goal from 1975 to 1985 required
accelerating monetary expansion over that period.
This expansion was accompanied by acceleratinginfla-
tion — a condition which implies that actual price
rises continue to exceed anticipated rises — in order
to keep unemployment below its “no~n~l rate.” The
inflation rate required to maintain the 3 per cent un-
employment rate was so high that it is unlikely a
price review board (as recommended by the Com-
inittee) or any price-wage control measure would
succeed in stemming such great pricepressures,
Two conclusions which emerge from the simulations
of the econometric model are: (1) monetary actions
must be supplemented by legislative and/or allocative
fiscal measures to reach and maintain the JEC’s goals
of a 3 per cent rate of unemployment without exces-
sive inflationary pressures; and (2) ii inflation Is per-
mitted to develop through attempts to achieve an
admirable unemployment goal such as that of the
JEC it is better to stem inflationary pçessures at an
early stage thanlater.
20Ceorge L Perry, “Changing Labor Markets and Inflation,”
Brooklngt Papers on EconomicActIvity (3:1970), pp. 411-41,
has also developed evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
inflation) to cause a shift from easy to tight money, it
Is possible to track the movements of the pertinent
variables from 1980 to 1985, as the stabilization au-
thorities attempt to achieve a2per cent annual price
rise by the end of the five-year period. A deceleration
in the annual growth rate of the money stock
from about 19 per cent in 1980 to a negative 6 per
cent in 1985 (see the lower portion of the next chart)
is required to slow the advance of prices from
14 per cent in 1980 to 2 per cent in 1985 (because
of lags, prices continue to rise from a 14 per cent
rate in 1980 to a 16 per cent rate in 1982 before
decelerating). Unemployment rises from a 3.2 per
cent rate in 1980 to 16 per cent of the labor force
In 1985, and real product (not shown on the chart)
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5
Thissin,u lotion depicts rates of money growth which w ill reduce the unemployment role
below 4 per cent by :975. Then, with intlotion accelerating, the simulation illustrates the
roles of money growthwhich will achieve 2 per cent inflation within five more years.
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declines in every successive
quarter from 1981 to 1985. The
severity of such a recession has
been matched in recent years
only by the experience of the
If stabilization authorities de-
cide five years earlier to switch
priority goals from unemploy-
ment to inflation, and adopt a
tight money policy in 1975
(when the unemployment rate
is 3,7 per cent and prices are
rising at about a 6 per cent
rate), it is much less costly to
bring prices to the 2 per cent
goal over a five-year period.
The required deceleration in the
rate of growth of money is
from a 10 per cent rate in 1975
to a3per cent rate in 1980 (see
the middle portion of the chart).
Unemployment rises to 8 per
cent (compared with 16 per cent
in thc previous simulation), and
real output growth never drops
below zero. If the money stock
is increased at a 6 per cent rate
beginning iu the third quarter
of 1971, prices fall below a 2
per cent rate by 1975 and the
unemployment rate does not ex-
ceed 6,3 per cent (see the upper
portion of the chart).
The clear implication of these
results is that it is far better
(in terms of lost employment
and output) to attack inflation
as early as possible in order to
halt its momentum and curtail
inflationary expectations.
This article is available
as Reprint No. 71
5
Thit St. louis Model timulotion depicts rotet of money growth which mill reduce inflation




I*This simulation depicts rates of money growth which wilt reduce theunemploynrest rote
below 4 per cent by 975, ondhold it there tar five years- Then, with inflation accelerating,
the simulation illustrates the rote of money growth which will achieve 2 per cent inflation
within five more years.
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